Homeland Security
From its inception, Gryphon Scientific has leveraged its expertise and experience to address daunting challenges in homeland security. Gryphon advises state and federal government officials on the most effective and efficient use of technology to defend the homeland against acts of terrorism. Gryphon investigates the biomedical data to assess the threat and to identify measures to mitigate the consequences of the hostile use of pathogens.Example Projects
Defining Requirements for Urban Biodefense Systems
For the Department of Homeland Security, Gryphon was chosen to evaluate three candidate architectures for improved urban biodefense systems being developed by the national laboratories. The primary focus of this project is for Gryphon to evaluate the calculations and assumptions implicit in the proposed architectures and arrive at consensus system requirements. A secondary focus of the project was to provide technical support based on analysis of the biomedical literature. In one task, we investigated the literature on human pathogens that are infectious by inhalation to report on global distribution, animal reservoirs, means of isolation and culturing, and stability in the environment. In another task, we investigated the literature on animal models of smallpox, including monkeypox and mousepox, to determine which aspects of smallpox (such as the relationship between dose and incubation time, efficacy of prophylaxes as a function of incubation time, presentation as a function of dose) these models correctly mimic and which they do not.
Assisting the Development of Next Generation Diagnostic Devices
For the Institute for Defense Analyses, Gryphon Scientific reviewed and analyzed the medical and scientific literature on 15 bacteria, viruses and toxins. We performed meta-analysis on the existing data to predict the presence of these pathogens in various medical samples as a function of the time course of infection. This report was produced to support the development of next-generation diagnostic devices. Relevant data were found in medical and veterinary case reports, epidemiological studies, and controlled animal model experiments. Various routes of administration of the pathogens were presented separately. Conflicting data were presented in our report with hypotheses as to the source of discrepancy. Conflicts were sometimes due to various methods used to determine viral load in a sample that were not directly comparable (such as culturing versus RT-PCR); these types of conflicts were resolved by investigating relative sensitivity and precision. One focus of our report was an assessment of our knowledge gaps on the presence of these pathogens in medical samples. Where knowledge was lacking, Gryphon outlined research paths to fill these gaps.
Developing Surveillance Systems for Food and Agricultural Security
Gryphon Scientific was chosen by the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture (also known as “the Partnership,” a consortium of agricultural and security stakeholders from 12 midwestern states) to set requirements for a surveillance system that protects the food and agricultural sectors against natural and intentional disease outbreaks and chemical contamination. In this project, our team researched the literature on existing food security, animal health, and public health surveillance systems and then conducted interviews with stakeholders in each of the 12 Partnership states to identify priorities and needs relative to agriculture and food surveillance. To evaluate existing systems, Gryphon developed models of incidents that compromise the safety of human food, animal feed, animal health, and plant health. These data were obtained through a review of the literature and through interviews with experts and stakeholders in the field. Combining these analyses enabled us to assess where gaps existed in this field and then to design requirements for a new system that filled those gaps. Importantly, the project concluded with the setting of requirements for three notional, cost-effective systems to meet the Partnership’s needs and to provide early warning for food and agricultural threats.
Estimating the Medical Resources Needed to Respond to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
For the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality of the Department of Health and Human Services, Gryphon was part of a team that built a software-based tool that enables local emergency planners to estimate the medical resources needed to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological and radiological incidents. The tool calculates the medical needs required by any urban area in the US to respond to attacks with chemical weapons, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), contagious and non-contagious biological agents, natural disease outbreaks, radiological dispersion devices, improvised nuclear devices, high-energy radioactive point sources and high explosives (covering the entire CBRNE spectrum). On this team, Gryphon Scientific provides one of the two principal investigators. Furthermore, the Gryphon team developed the module that produces casualty estimates (including the time-dependent appearance of casualties) that would result from these incidents through the use of sophisticated source terms and dispersion, epidemiology and pathogenicity/ toxicity models. These models are based upon information drawn from the biomedical, biophysical and biochemical literature.
Guiding Preparedness Policy
Gryphon staff serve on the Rad/Nuke Integrated Project Team to help DHHS develop triage protocols in the aftermath of nuclear incidents and to efficiently acquire and deploy the medical countermeasures needed to respond to incidents with radioisotopes, nuclear accidents and nuclear weapons. Gryphon staff supported the drafting of the Botulinum Toxin Playbook to guide ConOps for DHHS in the aftermath of a contamination event. Furthermore, Gryphon staff performed research and modeling to help guide the decisions of the Blood and Tissue Working Group of DHHS to identify the tissue and blood banking needs of the US in the aftermath of a variety of incidents. Additionally, we have developed scenario injects for use at the national political party conventions and, most recently, the presidential inauguration. These scenarios draw heavily upon data in the medical and engineering literature to ensure that the source terms, attack footprint and consequences are realistic and based on the best available data.
End-to-End Study on Attacks with Antibiotic Resistant Biological Agents
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Technology Directorate chose Gryphon Scientific by name to perform an end-to-end study examining the possibility and feasibility of an attack with multiply-drug-resistant (MDR) bacterial agents, including the impact of such agents compared to non-MDR agents, the production of such agents, the availability and efficacy of alternate countermeasures, and the strategies to limit the threat. The conclusions from this study were based on careful consideration of the medical and microbiological literature, as well as interviews with carefully selected subject matter experts. For our analysis, we created epidemic curves for the diseases caused by B. anthracis, Y pestis (including secondary transmission), B. pseudomallei, B. mallei, F. tularensis and R. prowazekeii. It appears that we are the first group to build epidemic models for several of these agents. Each model incorporated the efficacy of various schemes to deliver mass prophylaxis to prevent disease or death, including prevention against the engineered agents. Additionally, the study included a careful assessment of the efficacy of about 50 antibiotics against each of these threat agents (either wild-type or engineered). The study was briefed to the Homeland Security Council and at the Assistant Secretary Level DHS and HHS. We have received numerous compliments for the thoroughness, creativity and scientific rigor involved in the effort.
Providing Preparedness Assistance to State and Municipal Executives
For the Federal Emergency Management Agency (through a contract held by the Navy Postgraduate School), Gryphon Scientific provides subject matter expertise on biological, chemical and radiological hazards for a traveling panel that lends policy and technical advice to governors, mayors and their cabinets. Discussions with these senior executives focus on high-level decision-making and government policy related to the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to terrorist incidents and natural disasters. These topics include decision-making related to alerts from environmental monitoring systems, restoration after an attack, evacuation/sheltering, and continuity of essential services. Policy topics include mass prophylaxis (vaccination or mass distribution of antibiotics), medical surge capacity, and cross-credentialing of medical personnel.
Guiding the Acquisition and Deployment of Medical Resources
Furthermore, for HHS Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (HHS-BARDA), Gryphon is currently modeling the cost and benefit of supplying a variety of medical countermeasures through national stockpiles, a vendor-managed inventory held by the manufacturers, or through stocks held at hospitals close to high-risk targets. For this project we have modeled attacks and predicted the casualties likely to result in the absence of the countermeasures and in the presence of countermeasures supplied at various times post exposure. We then examined the various means of supplying the countermeasures, modeling the time taken to deliver the countermeasures to the victims and estimating all the cost components of delivering the countermeasures through the system (such as storage costs, purchase costs, disposal costs, costs of ancillary supplies to apply the countermeasure, etc). We then developed a sophisticated, flexible model that enables policy makers to explore how various options for the interplay of various delivery components affect the cost of the overall system and the casualties that result from the scenario. For example, the user can explore a system in which all immediate doses of the countermeasure are supplied by stocks held at local hospitals and how follow-on doses are supplied by a national stockpile and/or a vendor managed inventory.