Science Policy
As scientific research progresses, the scientific community gains greater ability to manipulate the basic functions of life. The capabilities that will soon be in the hands of humanity include the subtle manipulation of behavior, the modulation of pathogenicity and even the de novo creation of new forms of life. To ensure that biosafety measures continue to reduce the risk from accidental or intentional misuse of biology, we must be able to consider how cutting-edge advances in the life sciences brings new capabilities to scientists trying to improve the human condition and our adversaries willing to harness any technologies to attack us. Our in-depth understanding of biotechnology, based on our years in academic, industrial and government laboratories, enables Gryphon Scientific to produce thoughtful and actionable guidance on how to reduce the risk of the misuse of technology without fettering legitimate research.Example Projects
Limiting the Risk Posed by the Custom-Made Synthetic DNA
Gryphon has performed an in-depth study of the synthetic biology industry for the DHS Office of Policy. In this project, we developed a system for the screening of biological reagents to prevent hostile actors synthesizing dangerous viruses without fettering legitimate research. Gryphon identified regulatory authorities and agencies responsible for the operation of the system and response to its alarms. Importantly, Gryphon also used its contacts in academe and industry to determine the operational constraints under which this system must work, including handling of proprietary information and minimization of costly delays in the delivery of critical reagents. A key component of this study involved the evaluation of bioinformatic tools to help identify orders for biologicals that may pose a biosecurity risk. Our deep understanding of biotechnology enabled us to focus only on the technologies that materially contribute to the risk. These findings have materially influenced the oversight regime currently being considered by the government.
Developing a Definition of the Smallpox Virus
Also for DHS, Gryphon performed a bioinformatic study of the smallpox virus genome to determine if the legal definition of the pathogen was overly broad. We performed a gene-by-gene analysis of the smallpox genome and its near neighbors in the orthopoxvirus family to determine what level of identity and similarity could be used as a threshold to distinguish the virus from closely related viruses. We also investigated the genetic diversity found in smallpox virus across over 50 strains sequenced so far. At the project’s conclusion, Gryphon proposed candidate definitions that could be used to describe smallpox virus (including its natural and possible engineered variants) yet exclude its very similar near neighbors (like vaccinia virus, cowpox, and taterapox).
Reviewing Cutting Edge Advances in Microbiology
For the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, our staff investigated the field of prion science and its related diseases: mad cow disease, scrapie, chronic wasting disease, and new variant Cruetzfeldt-Jakob Disease. In this study, we summarized the current state of knowledge in the field and also identified promising lines of research to direct funding in the areas of diagnosis, prophylaxis and treatment of the disease and detection of its causative agent. Given the controversy in the field of prion science (some scientists still think that a cryptic virus is responsible for these illnesses instead of the prions themselves), we carefully summarized the arguments on both sides of the issue, and we highlighted their strengths and weaknesses.